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12.1 Introduction 
 
Unless the Swiss Parliament adopts a new law on corporate due diligence, Swiss citizens will 
decide in 2020 whether to adopt or reject a partial revision of the Constitution of Switzerland that 
aims to introduce a specific provision on responsible business.1 According to the proposal, 
companies that are based in Switzerland are required to carry out appropriate human rights and 
environmental due diligence in Switzerland and abroad. Furthermore, those companies shall be 
liable for human rights and environmental-related harm caused by (foreign) companies under their 
control unless they can prove that they took all due care to avoid the harm. 
 
This contribution first presents the international corporate human rights due diligence framework, 
as defined by the UNGPs2 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (‘OECD 
Guidelines’).3 In order to clarify the link between corporate due diligence and corporate liability, 
the first section focuses on the appropriate action that companies should take within this due 
diligence framework to prevent potential adverse impacts or to cease those that have occurred. The 
second section outlines the political background of the Swiss Popular Initiative on Responsible 
Business in light of the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, and then assesses this initiative. 
 
The last section compares the Swiss popular initiative with other legislative developments that have 
occurred after the adoption of the UNGPs. It distinguishes between mandatory disclosure laws, 
mandatory due diligence laws, and laws clarifying the legal consequences of failing to comply with 
 
1 The official text of the initiative can be found in French, German, and Italian at 
<www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis462t.html> accessed 14 November 2018. The English translation presented below 
is available on the website of the Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice at <https://corporatejustice.ch> accessed 18 
February 2018. 
2 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy”, Annex to UNHRC, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie (21 March 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/31. 
3 OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing 2000). 
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due diligence duties. In that third category, this contribution compares the Swiss popular initiative 
with the recently adopted French loi relative au devoir de vigilance. Both legislative initiatives 
clarify the corporate civil liability for human rights and environmental harm committed abroad, 
which should reduce, to some extent, the uncertainty related to outcomes of transnational litigation 
for corporate human rights and environment abuses. 
 
12.2 Corporate human rights and environmental due diligence  
 
The UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines are soft-law instruments and do not impose binding legal 
obligations upon states or companies. However, they have given rise to binding obligations 
regarding corporate human rights and environmental due diligence – for instance, in the French loi 
relative au devoir de vigilance. In any event, they provide a relatively clear standard of conduct for 
business enterprises. 
 
With respect to other elements, both Guidelines define the due diligence that companies should 
apply regarding human rights.4 Due diligence is the process through which enterprises can identify, 
prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their actual and potential adverse impacts.5 The 
OECD Guidelines define human rights due diligence in the same way.6 
 
On the contrary, environmental issues are not specifically addressed in the UNGPs, which cover 
only human rights. Corporations are nevertheless expected to respect and conduct due diligence 
with regard to all internationally recognized human rights, including those that necessarily entail 
environmental aspects, such as the rights to health, water, or food, or the rights of indigenous 
peoples.7 Additionally, Chapter VI of the OECD Guidelines defines the conduct that multinational 
enterprises should adopt to take due account of the need to protect the environment. This section 
focuses mainly on human rights and human rights-related environmental due diligence, as they are 
 
4 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principles 17–21. 
5 ibid Guiding Principle 17. 
6 OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, commentary para 14 and ch IV, commentary para 15. 
7 See for further comments, Mirina Grosz, ‘Menschenrechte als Vehikel für ökologische Unternehmensverantwortung’ 
(2017) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 982. 
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covered by both the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines. Section 12.3 will present how the Swiss 
Popular Initiative defines human rights and environmental due diligence. 
 
Both the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines specify what is expected from business enterprises for 
each step of the due diligence process.8 With a view to linking due diligence and corporate liability, 
this contribution focuses on the appropriate action that business enterprises should take to prevent 
potential adverse human rights impacts or cease actual ones (section 12.2.1). Actual adverse 
impacts – those that have already occurred9 – could also be subject to remediation. This section 
then discusses compensation through civil liability as one form of remedy (section 12.2.2). 
Presenting this international standard of corporate conduct will aid assessment of the Swiss Popular 
Initiative on Responsible Business. 
 
12.2.1 Corporate due diligence: taking appropriate action 
 
Regarding the appropriate action that companies should take to prevent or cease adverse impact, 
Guiding Principle 19(b) of the UNGPs distinguishes between three scenarios. Each scenario has 
different implications for the nature of a business enterprise’s responsibility.10 
 
First, where a business enterprise causes or may cause an adverse impact, it should take the 
necessary steps to cease or prevent the impact.11 This would apply, for example, in the case of a 
business enterprise being the main source of pollution in a community’s drinking water supply due 
to chemical effluents from its production processes.12 Second, where a business enterprise 
contributes or may contribute to an adverse impact, it should take the necessary steps to cease or 
prevent its contribution. According to the OECD Guidelines, contributing to an adverse impact 
should be interpreted as a substantial contribution, meaning an activity that causes, facilitates, or 
 
8 Nicolas Bueno, ‘Corporate Liability for Violations of the Human Right to Just Conditions of Work in Extraterritorial 
Operations’ (2017) 21 The International Journal of Human Rights 565, 571–73; Olga Martin-Ortega, ‘Human Rights 
Due Diligence for Corporations: From Voluntary Standards to Hard Law at Last?’ (2014) 32 Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 44, 55–57; Justine Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: Soft Law or not 
Law?’, in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (CUP 2013) 156-57. 
9 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19, commentary. 
10 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretative Guide (UN 2012) 15. 
11 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19, commentary. 
12 OHCHR (n 10) 17. 
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incentivizes another entity to cause an adverse impact.13 The OHCHR gives the example of an 
enterprise changing product requirements for suppliers without adjusting production deadlines and 
prices, thus pushing suppliers to breach labour standards in order to deliver.14 Although highly 
relevant in practice, it is not clear from the international framework to what extent failures to 
supervise or intervene in the harmful conduct of a business entity – such as a subsidiary or a 
supplier – enter into the notion of contribution. However, in any event, the enterprise should use 
its leverage to mitigate impacts, in addition to ceasing or preventing its contribution.15 Leverage is 
considered to exist where the enterprise has the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices 
of the entity that is causing or contributing to an adverse impact.16 
 
In the two first scenarios, the business enterprise causes or contributes to adverse impacts through 
its own activities,17 including its own activities in the supply chain.18 An enterprise can finally be 
involved in an adverse impact when the impact is caused by an entity with which it has a business 
relationship and when the company is directly linked to that company’s own operations, products, 
or services.19 The OHCHR gives the example of a supplier acting contrary to the terms of its 
contract and using child or bonded labour to manufacture a product for the enterprise, without any 
intended or unintended pressure from the enterprise to do so.20 Indeed, if the enterprise had 
pressured the supplier, it would have contributed to the adverse impact. The legal literature has 
provided other examples in which the notions of ‘contribution’ and ‘directly linked’ are sometimes 
understood in different ways.21 In the third scenario, the appropriate measure to be taken depends 
on the leverage the enterprise has on the entity causing or contributing to the adverse impact. If the 
business enterprise has leverage to mitigate the adverse impact it should exercise this, as in the 
 
13 OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, commentary para 14. 
14 OHCHR (n 10) 19. 
15 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19, commentary. 
16 ibid; OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, commentary para 19; OHCHR (n 10) 7. 
17 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 13(a). 
18 OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, commentary para 17. 
19 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19, commentary; OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, A 12. 
20 OHCHR (n 10) 56. See also for other examples, Christine Kaufmann, ‘Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: 
Grenzenlose Verantwortlichkeit?’ (2016) Swiss Review of Business and Financial Market Law 45, 51; Nicolas Bueno, 
‘La responsabilité des entreprises de respecter les droits de l’Homme: État de la pratique suisse’ (2017) Pratique 
Juridique Actuelle 1015, 1016. 
21 cf Olivier de Schutter, ‘Corporations and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’, in Eibe Riedel, Gilles Giacca, and 
Christophe Golay (eds), Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in International Law: Contemporary Issues and 
Challenges (OUP 2014) 212-16; Martin-Ortega (n 8) 56; Christine Kaufmann et al., Extraterritorialität im Bereich 
Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte (Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights 2016). 
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contribution scenario. If it lacks leverage, it should try to increase its leverage. Finally, when 
increasing leverage is impossible, it should consider terminating the relationship.22 
 
In the two last scenarios, another entity is always involved. Thus, in both situations the appropriate 
actions to be taken vary according to the extent of an enterprise’s leverage in addressing the 
impact.23 The extent of leverage over another business entity is a factual question. Some factors 
help identify the extent of leverage, such as the degree of direct control by the enterprise over the 
entity; the terms of contract between the enterprise and the entity; the proportion of business the 
enterprise represents for the entity; or the ability of the enterprise to incentivize the other entity to 
improve human rights.24 
 
12.2.2 Human rights due diligence and corporate liability 
 
While the UNGPs recommend that states implement and enforce laws that are aimed at, or have 
the effect of requiring, business enterprises to respect human rights,25 they do not entail specific 
recommendations about legal sanctions or corporate liability in the event that a business enterprise 
does not carry out human rights due diligence. However, they do provide guidance regarding 
remediation after an actual adverse impact has occurred, both to companies and to states.  
 
Whenever enterprises identify that they have caused or contributed to adverse impacts – the first 
two scenarios – they are expected to provide for remediation through grievance mechanisms, which 
should conform to the effectiveness criteria of Guiding Principle 31 of the UNGPs.26 As such, 
remediation is part of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. States, on the other hand, 
are expected, among other elements, to take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of 
domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including 
considering ways to reduce legal, practical and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of 
 
22 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19, commentary; OECD Guidelines (n 3) ch II, commentary para 22, for the steps 
to be taken before termination. 
23 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 19(b)(ii). 
24 OHCHR (n 10) 49, among other factors. 
25 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 3(a). 
26 OHCHR (n 10) 71, 75–80. 
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access to remedy.27 Remedy may include apologies, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-
financial compensation, and punitive sanctions, as well as the prevention of harm through, for 
example, injunctions or guarantees of non-repetition.28 
 
Among legal barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy, the UNGPs mention the way 
in which legal responsibility is attributed among members of a corporate group under domestic 
laws. This should not facilitate the avoidance of appropriate accountability.29 In this respect, the 
OHCHR adds that the corporate group structure does not make any difference regarding whether 
entities within the group have to respect human rights – it simply affects how they go about 
ensuring that rights are respected in practice. If human rights abuses do occur, it will be the national 
law in the relevant jurisdiction that determines where liability rests.30 Other legal barriers also arise 
where claimants face a denial of justice in a host state and cannot access home state courts 
regardless of the merits of the claim.31  The UNGPs finally note that many legal and practical 
barriers result from imbalances between the parties to business-related human rights claims, such 
as their financial resources, access to information, and expertise.32 
 
The UNGPs are an important framework regarding corporate civil liability for human rights and 
human rights-related environmental abuses. However, they do not entail specific recommendations 
to states on how they should regulate issues of jurisdiction, applicable law, or the material 
conditions of parent or contracting company liability. These elements remain a matter of domestic 
law. They have given rise to much uncertainty in the emerging relevant transnational civil 
litigation, as is the case for material conditions of parent-company liability. 
 
In the English case of Chandler v Cape of 2012, for example, the Court of Appeal developed four 
criteria to establish when law may impose on a parent company responsibility for the health and 
 
27 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 26, commentary. 
28 ibid Guiding Principle 25, commentary. 
29 ibid. See also for a comparative approach on the question of liability and the structure of the corporate group, Gwynne 
Skinner, Robert McCorquodale, and Olivier de Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human 
Rights Violations by Transnational Business (ICAR, CORE, ECCJ, 2013) 61. 
30 OHCHR (n 10) 22. 
31 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 26, commentary. The Council of Europe clarified the question of jurisdiction in 
Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on human 
rights and business, 2 March 2016, paras 34–35.  
32 UNGPs (n 2) Guiding Principle 26, commentary 
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safety of its subsidiary’s employees.33 Concretely, it found the parent company Cape liable for 
asbestos-related injuries caused to an employee of a subsidiary. However, in Thompson v The 
Renwick Group of 2014, it found that the criteria were not met for a holding parent company 
carrying out any business at all apart from that of holding shares in other companies.34 Similar 
questions of parent liability for the harm caused to employees of a subsidiary have been addressed 
in France in the cases of Areva and Comilog.35 Finally, the Dutch Shell Nigeria case, which is, at 
the time of writing, pending, should shed light on the question of the duty of care owed by a parent 
company to third parties.36 
 
So far, there has also been no court verdict on the merits of addressing the liability of a company 
for damage caused by a foreign supplier. The ongoing case of Jabir et al. v KiK is expected to 
clarify this question in Germany. In September 2012, over 250 workers died in a fire at a factory 
in Pakistan that supplied the German textile corporation KiK. The plaintiffs filed a compensation 
claim against KiK alleging that it shared responsibility for the fire-safety deficiencies in the 
Pakistani factory.37 Despite emerging case law, one lesson is the uncertainty for both plaintiffs and 
defendants about criteria to be used to determine a company’s civil liability for the harm caused by 
a subsidiary or a supplier. The next section presents and assesses the Swiss Popular Initiative on 
Responsible Business in light of the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines, and discusses the extent 
to which it will clarify the conditions of parent and contracting liability in transnational civil 
litigation. 
 
12.3 The Swiss popular initiative on responsible business 
 
12.3.1 Political background 
 
 
33 Chandler v Cape plc (2012) EWCA Civ 525, para 80. 
34 Thompson v The Renwick Group plc (2014) EWCA Civ 635, para 37. For details, see Bueno (n 8) 576. 
35 Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 24 octobre 2013, no 12/05650 (Areva); Cour d’Appel de Paris, Arrêt du 10 
septembre 2015, nos 11/05955 and 11/0596 (Comilog). For more detail on the case of Comilog, see Liesbeth Enneking, 
‘Paying the Price for Socially Irresponsible Business Practices?’ (2017) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 991 and on the 
case of Areva, see Bueno (n 8) 576–77. 
36 Court of Appeal The Hague, 17 December 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586-7-8 (Oguru-Efanga/Shell), 
(Dooh/Shell), (Shell/Akpan). For more details, see Enneking (n 35) 992. 
37 See Bueno (n 8) 579. 
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The Position Paper on CSR and the National Action Plan 
Three years after the endorsement of the UNGPs by the UNHRC in 2011, the Swiss government 
released a report in comparative law on the legal obligations of corporate directors to conduct due 
diligence with regard to business activities abroad.38 In this comparative law report, the government 
identified potential measures that could be adopted in company law to increase the corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights. The proposed measures included the introduction of a 
specific duty for corporate directors to exercise human rights due diligence.39 A failure to comply 
with their due diligence duties would trigger their liability.40 In March 2015, however, the lower 
chamber of the Parliament rejected, with a narrow majority,41 a motion requiring the government 
to take further steps with a view to implementing the measures identified in the comparative law 
report.42 
 
In April 2015, the Swiss government also adopted the Position Paper on CSR (Position Paper 
2015).43 In this document, it presented four strategies for the period 2015–2019 regarding CSR. It 
set out plans to develop the definition of CSR within international fora, such as the UN and the 
OECD; support companies implementing their CSR; promote CSR in developing countries; and 
work for the improvement of corporate transparency.44 Position Paper 2015 raised some criticism 
for not addressing the issue of corporate civil liability.45 Indeed, the paper was not intended to 
introduce mandatory human rights due diligence provisions or clarify the conditions upon which 
corporations based in Switzerland could be held liable for human rights abuses committed abroad. 
 
 
38 Swiss Federal Council, ‘Rapport de droit comparé : Mécanismes de diligence en matière de droits humains et 
d'environnement en rapport avec les activités d'entreprises suisses à l'étranger’ (2 May 2014) 
<www.ejpd.admin.ch/dam/data/bj/aktuell/news/2014/2014-05-28/ber-apk-nr-f.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018. See 
Annex I for the report of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law. 
39 ibid 9. 
40 ibid 11. 
41 The motion was first accepted by 91:90 before it was again submitted to vote and rejected by 95:86. 
42 Swiss Parliament, ‘Motion 14.3671: Mise en œuvre du rapport de droit comparé du Conseil fédéral sur la 
responsabilité des entreprises en matière de droits humains et d'environnement’ (1 September 2014) 
<www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20143671> accessed 14 November 2018. 
43 Swiss Federal Council, ‘La responsabilité sociétale des entreprises: Position et plan d’action du Conseil fédéral 
concernant la responsabilité des entreprises à l’égard de la société et de l’environnement’ (1 April 2015) 
<www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/38882.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018. 
44 ibid 13–17. 
45 Rolf H Weber, ‘Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Konzept der Unternehmensverantwortlichkeit ?’ (2016) 112 Revue 
suisse de jurisprudence 121, 123. 
 9 
 
Finally, on 9 December 2016, the Swiss government released its National Action Plan (NAP) on 
implementation of the UNGPs, which should be read as a complement of equivalent value to 
Position Paper 2015.46 In the NAP, the Swiss government set out the expectation that corporations 
that are domiciled or active in Switzerland respect human rights in their activities in Switzerland 
and abroad.47 However, like Position Paper 2015, the NAP did not introduce any mandatory human 
rights due diligence provisions in Swiss law, nor did it provide any clarification as to the conditions 
of liability of Switzerland-based companies for human rights or environmentally adverse impact 
abroad resulting from the operations of foreign subsidiaries, subcontractors, or suppliers. 
 
Regarding mandatory due diligence, the NAP acknowledged that there is currently no legally 
binding provision in Swiss law requiring that corporations conduct human rights due diligence in 
their operations abroad.48 In December 2016, when the NAP was released, the Swiss government 
outlined that no other country had adopted such legally binding provisions.49 It concluded that any 
regulation that Switzerland would introduce in that regard should be broadly adopted 
internationally in order to avoid the Swiss economy being penalized.50 Regarding access to remedy 
in Switzerland for victims of corporate abuses, the NAP focuses exclusively on private 
international law questions. It broadly states that for transnational tort claims there is always a 
forum in Switzerland when the defendant is a corporation domiciled in Switzerland, and that 
fundamental norms in Switzerland, such as human rights, are applicable regardless of the 
applicable law.51 In September 2018, Switzerland released a specific report on Access to Remedy. 
Despite identified international developments, it did not recommend the adoption of regulatory 
measures introducing a mandatory due diligence provision in Swiss law.52 
 
 
46 Swiss Federal Council, ‘Rapport sur la stratégie de la Suisse visant à mettre en œuvre les Principes directeurs des 
Nations Unies relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l’homme’ (9 December 2016) 12 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/NationalPlans/Switzerland_NAP_FR.pdf> accessed 
14 November 2018. The NAP follows the report.   
47 ibid 7–8 and 12. 
48 ibid 15. 
49 ibid.  
50 ibid. 
51 ibid 39; Kaufmann et al. (n 21) 61–63; Christine Kaufmann et al., Mise en oeuvre des droits humains en Suisse: Un 
état des lieux dans le domaine droits de l’homme et économie (Swiss Center of Expertise in Human Rights 2013) 54-
56, for private international law questions in Switzerland. 
52 Swiss Federal Council, Entreprises et droits de l’homme: analyse comparée des mesures judiciaires et non judiciaires 
offrant un accès à la réparation, 14 September 2018. 
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Human rights due diligence and liability in specific sectors 
Beyond the political developments set out here, which cover companies in all economic sectors, 
the Swiss government has taken some measures in relation to specific sectors. A key example is 
the recently entered into force Swiss Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad 
2013. The Act expressly prohibits the provision, from Switzerland, of private security services for 
the purpose of direct participation in hostilities abroad, or of those that may be assumed to be 
utilized by the recipient or recipients in the commission of serious human rights violations.53 These 
prohibitions apply expressly to parent and contracting companies based in Switzerland.54  
 
Regarding liability, criminal sanctions are in place for individuals who infringe the prohibitions.55 
The Act does not cover corporate civil liability. However, it should be noted that article 6 of the 
Act sets out that where a company contracts out the provision of a security service to another 
company, it has to ensure that the subcontractor performs that service in keeping with the 
constraints to which the contracting company is itself subject. Interestingly, the civil liability of the 
contracting company for harm caused by the (foreign) subcontractor should be determined in 
accordance with the Swiss Code of Obligations.56 The Act does not mention whether the Swiss 
Code of Obligations would also apply to determine the civil liability of a parent company for the 
harm caused by a foreign subsidiary. In any event, the Swiss Code of Obligations does not entail 
any specific provision on extracontractual liability of contracting companies for the harm caused 
to third parties by their subcontractors or subsidiaries, and no relevant case law currently exists in 
that regard.57 Future case law will thus have to show how Swiss courts will solve the question of 
civil liability of Swiss-based providers of private security services abroad. 
 
Finally, the Swiss government has set out two recommendations on the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights for the commodities sector.58 The first deals with the redaction of a guide on 
 
53 Private Security Services Provided Abroad Act 2013 (CH), arts 8 and 9. Companies can also be subject to 
administrative sanctions defined in arts 25 and 26. 
54 ibid arts 5 and 6. 
55 ibid arts 21–24. 
56 ibid art 6.  
57 Nicolas Bueno and Sophie Scheidt, Die Sorgfaltspflichten von Unternehmen im Hinblick auf die Einhaltung von 
Menschenrechten bei Auslandsaktivitäten (Netzwerk Soziale Verantwortung 2015) 10. 
58 Swiss Federal Council, ‘3e rapport concernant l’état d’avancement de la mise en œuvre des recommandations’ 
(2 December 2016) 13–14 <www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/46473.pdf> accessed 
14 November 2018. 
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implementation of the UNGPs in the commodity sector; the second with mandatory due diligence 
provisions for corporations in that sector.59 Regarding mandatory due diligence, the government is 
following international legislative developments on reporting and on mandatory due diligence in 
conflict minerals industries. It is following developments taking place in the EU60 and has 
expressed the possibility of adopting similar provisions that are adapted to the Swiss context.61 
However, there is no recommendation to clarify the conditions of corporate liability of parent, 
subcontracting, or contracting companies in the commodity sector for human rights abuses. 
 
12.3.2 The initiative text and its content 
 
In parallel to the abovementioned political and legislative developments in Switzerland, the Swiss 
Coalition for Corporate Justice, representing over eighty NGOs in Switzerland, launched the 
popular constitutional initiative ‘Responsible Business: Protecting Human Rights and the 
Environment’. The initiative collected the requisite threshold of 100,000 signatures and Swiss 
citizens will have to decide whether to adopt or reject this partial revision of the Swiss Constitution 
unless the Parliament adopts a satisfactory counter-proposal, which is in discussion.62 In that case, 
the committee that launched the popular initiative could consider withdrawing the initiative. 
 
Popular initiatives in Switzerland aim at revising the constitution; for example, that on responsible 
business aims to add article 101a, ‘Responsibility of Business’, to the Swiss Constitution. 
Statistically, since the introduction of the popular initiative in 1891, 209 popular initiatives have 
led to a vote, 22 of which have been accepted. From 1848 to 2010, however, 47% of all popular 
initiatives triggered some kind of modification of the legislation.63 Technically, if the constitutional 
initiative is adopted the constitutional rule will have to be implemented through a more detailed 
 
59 ibid 13. 
60 ibid 14. In particular Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 
laying down supply chain due diligence obligations for Union importers of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and 
gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas [2017] OJ L 130/1. 
61 NAP (n 46) 29. 
62 See Swiss National Council, Rapport complémentaire de la Commission des affaires juridiques du 18 mai 2018 sur 
les propositions de la commission en vue du dépôt d’un contre-projet indirect à l’initiative populaire «Entreprises 
responsables – pour protéger l’être humain et l’environnement» (18 May 2018)  
<https://www.parlament.ch/centers/kb/Documents/2016/Rapport_de_la_commission_CAJ-N_16.077_2018-05-
18.pdf> accessed 14 November 2018. 
63 Gabriela Rohner, Die Wirksamkeit von Volksinitiativen im Bund 1848–2010 (Schulthess 2012) 115. 
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piece of sub-constitutional legislation, which would probably be included in the Swiss Code of 
Obligations. 
 
The text of the initiative 
The text of the proposed article 101a Constitution reads as follows: 
 
1 The Confederation shall take measures to strengthen respect for human rights and the 
environment through business. 
2 The law shall regulate the obligations of companies that have their registered office, 
central administration, or principal place of business in Switzerland according to the 
following principles: 
a. Companies must respect internationally recognized human rights and international 
environmental standards, also abroad; they must ensure that human rights and 
environmental standards are also respected by companies under their control. Whether 
a company controls another is to be determined according to the factual circumstances. 
Control may also result through the exercise of power in a business relationship. 
b. Companies are required to carry out appropriate due diligence. This means in 
particular that they must: identify real and potential impacts on internationally 
recognized human rights and the environment; take appropriate measures to prevent 
the violation of internationally recognized human rights and international 
environmental standards, cease existing violations, and account for the actions taken. 
These duties apply to controlled companies as well as to all business relationships. The 
scope of the due diligence to be carried out depends on the risks to the environment 
and human rights. In the process of regulating mandatory due diligence, the legislator 
is to take into account the needs of small and medium-sized companies that have 
limited risks of this kind. 
c. Companies are also liable for damage caused by companies under their control where 
they have, in the course of business, committed violations of internationally recognized 
human rights or international environmental standards. They are not liable under this 
provision however if they can prove that they took all due care per paragraph b to avoid 
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the loss or damage, or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had 
been taken. 
d. The provisions based on the principles of paragraphs a-c apply irrespective of the 
law applicable under private international law.64 
 
Mandatory due diligence, liability, and applicable law 
After setting the general goal of the initiative in Paragraph 1, the initiative text entails three 
elements to implement this goal in Paragraph 2. First, Article 101a(2)(b) introduces and defines 
the scope of a mandatory due diligence provision in the Swiss Constitution. Article 101a(2)(c) then 
addresses the liability of companies based in Switzerland, including their liability for harm caused 
by companies under their control. Finally, Article 101a(2)(c) aims to ensure that the introduced 
mandatory due diligence and liability provisions will apply even though the human rights or 
environmental-related harm typically occurs abroad. These three elements of mandatory due 
diligence, liability and applicable law are discussed in turn. 
 
First, the initiative requires that companies identify human rights and environmental impacts, take 
measures to prevent or cease adverse impacts, and account for how they address these impacts. In 
other terms, section (2)(b) introduces a mandatory due diligence provision. The scope of this due 
diligence covers human rights, as well as the environment. Regarding the environment, which the 
UNGPs do not cover explicitly,65 the explanatory note of the initiative text expressly refers to the 
OECD Guidelines, which entails specific recommendations for multinational enterprises.66  
 
Concretely, the introduction of a mandatory due diligence provision objectifies the expected 
conduct that Switzerland-based companies must apply with a view to preventing adverse human 
rights and environmental impacts in Switzerland and abroad. In this regard, the text of the initiative 
does not distinguish between the three scenarios presented above: causing an adverse impact, 
contributing to an adverse impact through the enterprise’s own activities, and adverse impacts 
 
64 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice, ‘The Initiative Text with Explanations’ <https://corporatejustice.ch/wp-
content/uploads//2018/06/KVI_Factsheet_5_E.pdf> accessed 18 February 2018.  
65 See section 12.2.  
66 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice (n 644). 
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directly linked to the enterprise’s operations by a business relationship.67 It broadly states that due 
diligence ‘duties apply to controlled companies as well as to all business relationships’.68 However, 
according to the explanation of the initiative text, section (2)(b) introduces a mandatory due 
diligence provision based on the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines.69 Therefore, the international 
framework may provide guidance on how to interpret the text of the initiative. Although not 
expressly referenced in the text, this standard of conduct should help to identify whether a company 
has committed a fault and should be held liable for its own actions and omissions on the basis of 
the general tort of negligence.70 
 
Second, section (2)(c) brings about a specific liability for the harm caused by others. ‘Others’ 
means exclusively controlled companies, and thus not all business relationships to which due 
diligence duties apply. This liability for others has been modelled on the existing employer’s 
liability in the Swiss Code of Obligations.71 Accordingly, when a controlled company causes harm, 
the controlling company is liable unless it can prove that it took all due care to avoid the loss or 
damage, or that the damage would have occurred even if all due care had been taken. This liability 
provision addresses the practical difficulty that plaintiffs may face in bringing evidence about the 
conduct of controlling companies located abroad. As a result, it is not up to the plaintiff to prove 
that the controlling company acted negligently, but up to the company to prove that it took the 
required due care. For the rest, section (2)(c) does not reverse the burden of proof. It remains the 
plaintiff’s responsibility to prove the harm, the causality, and the control relationship between the 
business entities. 
 
The notion of ‘control’ in section (2)(c) is not a UNGPs concept.72 It is also not precisely defined 
in the initiative text, which states that control is to be determined according to the factual 
circumstances, and that control may also result through the exercise of power in a business 
 
67 See section 12.2.1.  
68 Swiss Popular Initiative on Responsible Business, art 101a(2)(b). 
69 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice (n 64). 
70 In Switzerland, under art 41 Code des obligations. For more detail, see Gregor Geisser, ‘Die 
Konzernverantwortungsinitiative: Darstellung, rechtliche Würdigung und mögliche Umsetzung’ (2017) Pratique 
Juridique Actuelle 943, 948–49. Article 101a(2)(c) states that companies are also liable for damage caused by 
companies under their control, which means in addition to the liability for their own conduct. 
71 Geisser (n 70) 954. 
72 However, control is used in the OHCHR Interpretative Guide in relation to parent companies. OHCHR (n 10) 22, 
and in relation to leverage 48–49. 
 15 
 
relationship.73 Thus, it is up to the legislative and the judiciary to clarify it in practice. However, 
according to the explanations of the initiative text, controlled companies are generally subsidiaries 
of parent companies. Nevertheless, in certain cases a multinational company could also de facto 
control another company outside its strict legal structure through the exercise of economic control. 
For example, a relationship of control may exist if a Swiss company is the only purchaser from a 
supplier, even if the latter is not a direct subsidiary.74 Therefore, control is narrower than the 
concept of leverage presented above, as companies may have leverage over other entities without 
controlling them, according to the Swiss initiative.75 
  
Finally, section (2)(d) ensures that the new standard of conduct for corporations and the conditions 
of liability for torts will apply in practice before Swiss courts. Under Swiss private international 
law, as in other countries, transnational claims in tort are generally governed by the law of the 
country in which the result occurred.76 Thus, foreign tort law would generally apply to cases in 
which the result materializes abroad, which would render useless the mandatory due diligence and 
liability provisions Article 101a(2)(b) and (c) intend to introduce in Swiss law. Expressly making 
these provisions overriding mandatory provisions of Swiss law would ensure their application 
before Swiss courts in an international matter dealing with human rights or environmental due 
diligence. 
 
12.4 The Swiss popular initiative in international comparison 
 
12.4.1 Mandatory disclosure laws 
 
An increasing number of laws require that companies disclose information regarding human rights. 
For example, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 requires every retail seller 
and manufacturer doing business in California and having worldwide gross receipts that exceed 
US$100 million to disclose their efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from their 
 
73 Swiss Initiative on Responsible Business, art 101a(2)(a). 
74 Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice (n 64). 
75 See Swiss Initiative on Responsible Business and section 12.2.1.  
76 Art 133(2) Swiss Private International Law Act. 
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supply chains.77 The Modern Slavery Act 2015 in the UK has a similar scope. It requires that 
commercial organizations prepare a slavery and human trafficking statement. Among other 
information, the statement must include information about parts of the organization’s business and 
supply chains where a risk of slavery and human trafficking exists, and the steps it has taken to 
address that risk.78 
 
The EU Directive 2014/95 on Disclosure of Non-Financial Information also enters into the 
category of mandatory disclosure laws. Large enterprises must include a non-financial statement 
containing information about the development, performance, position, and impact of their activity 
relating to environmental, social, and employee matters; respect for human rights; anti-corruption; 
and bribery matters.79 Interestingly, the enterprise has to report the risks of adverse impact 
stemming not only from its own activities, but also from those linked to its operations, products, 
services and business relationships, including its supply and subcontracting chains.80 However, the 
company is not required to pursue policies in relation to those matters; in that case, it must only 
provide a clear and reasoned explanation for not doing so.81  
 
The California Act, the Modern Slavery Act, and the EU Directive 2014/95 do not introduce a due 
diligence standard. They also do not clarify the conditions of liability for parent or contracting 
companies. Some suggest that even if information that companies must disclose does not lead to 
any legal sanctions, companies may still seek to change their behaviour if they believe that such 
information would lead to non-legal sanctions, such as reputational harm.82 Although mandatory 
disclosure provisions have a preventive rather than remediation purpose, they may facilitate the 
establishment of corporate liability after harm has occurred. Indeed, mandatory disclosure 
requirements make it more difficult for a company to argue that it did not know, or could not have 
 
77 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act 2010 (US), s 1714.43(a)(1). See for an overview, Benjamin T Greer 
and Jeffrey Purvis, ‘Corporate Supply Chain Transparency: California’s Seminal Attempt to Discourage Forced 
Labour’ (2016) 20 The International Journal of Human Rights 55. 
78 Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK), s 54(4)(a). 
79 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending Directive 
2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and groups 
[2014] OJ L 330/1, art 19a(1). 
80 ibid art 19a(1)(d) and preamble, para 8. 
81 ibid art 19a(1). 
82 Stephen Park, ‘Human Rights Reporting as Self-Interest: The Integrative and Expressive Dimensions of Corporate 
Disclosure’, in Robert C Bird, Daniel R Cahoy, and Jamie D. Prenkert (eds), Law, Business and Human Rights: 
Bridging the Gap (Edward Elgar Publishing 2014) 53. 
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known, about adverse impacts. Therefore, these regulations may be an important step towards more 
accountability. However, in the end, since they do not clarify any due diligence standard and 
conditions of liability, they do not significantly reduce the uncertainty related to outcomes of 
transnational litigation for corporate abuses.83 
 
12.4.2 Mandatory due diligence laws 
 
With respect to specific issues, such as conflict minerals, some laws have introduced mandatory 
due diligence standards beyond disclosure requirements. For example, section 1502 of the Dodd–
Frank Act on conflict minerals requires that some companies submit a report on the measures taken 
to exercise due diligence regarding the supply chain of conflict minerals.84 In addition, the Final 
Rule for its implementation85 does specify the standard for due diligence that must be exercised 
once a company has determined that it uses conflict minerals.86 Accordingly, companies must 
follow a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework.87 The Final Rule 
specifically states that the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas may be used as such a framework.88 The 
EU has recently taken a similar approach by defining the due diligence that importers of some 
specific minerals originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas must adopt beyond 
disclosure requirements.89 
 
The introduction of a standard of conduct that companies should adopt would certainly help to 
assess corporate liability once harm occurs. The company’s failure to meet the expected standard 
can be considered unlawful and result in the obligation to compensate the harm. However, like 
mandatory disclosure laws, mandatory due diligence laws do not mention or elaborate on corporate 
liability.  
 
83 Bueno (n 8) 580. 
84 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 (US), s 1502(b)(p)(1)(a). See for reporting 
requirements, Park (n 82) 63. 
85 Securities and Exchange Commission, 17 CFR pts 240 and 249b, Conflict Minerals, Final Rule, August 2012 (Sec 
1502 Final Rule). 
86 Martin-Ortega (n 8) 66. 
87 Sec 1502 Final Rule (n 85) 205. 
88 ibid 206; Martin-Ortega (n 8) 66. 
89 Directive 2014/95/EU (n 79). 
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12.4.3 Human rights due diligence and liability provisions 
 
A third category of laws includes those defining the standard of corporate due diligence and, in 
addition, specifying the legal consequences of failing to carry it out. Legal consequences can take 
the form of criminal liability or civil liability depending on who must enforce the due diligence 
standard – the public prosecutor or the victim. The Swiss popular initiative enters into that last 
category. Indeed, the text of the initiative entails a mandatory due diligence provision in 
section (2)(b) and clarifies the corporate liability for the harm, at least for the harm caused by 
controlled companies in section (2)(c). There are other examples of human rights due diligence 
laws accompanied by liability provisions. 
 
The abovementioned Swiss Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad 2013,90 for 
example, requires that companies that are based in Switzerland and provide private security 
services abroad become signatories to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Providers.91 This code of conduct clarifies the due diligence that security service providers should 
carry out. Beyond defining the standard of due diligence, criminal liability provisions are in place 
to ensure that individuals within companies meet their due diligence obligations.92 Another 
example is the Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Proposal. The proposal entails a mandatory due 
diligence provision. In that regard, companies based in the Netherlands should act in accordance 
with the International Labour Organization Child Labour Guidance Tool for Business.93 In 
addition, the proposal entails administrative and criminal fines for companies that do not submit a 
declaration that they have conducted due diligence, or that fail to conduct due diligence when 
required.94 The legislative proposal was passed by the Dutch House of Representatives in February 
2017 and is currently pending before the Dutch Senate.95  
 
90 See n 53. 
91 Private Security Services Provided Abroad Act 2013 (CH) (n 53) art 21–24. 
92 Child Labour Due Diligence Law Proposal (NL), art 5(3). 
93 ibid art 7(1). 
94 ibid art 7(2). See also Christine Kaufmann, ‘Menschen-und umweltrechtliche Sorgfaltsprüfung im internationalen 
Vergleich’ (2017) Pratique Juridique Actuelle 974. 
95 See Eerste Kamer der State-Generaal, ‘Initiatiefvoorstel-Kuiken Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid’ 
<www.eerstekamer.nl/wetsvoorstel/34506_initiatiefvoorstel_kuiken> accessed 14 November 2018 and Eerste Kamer 
der State-Generaal, ‘Debat Wet zorgplicht kinderarbeid aangehouden’ 
<www.eerstekamer.nl/nieuws/20171219/debat_wet_zorgplicht_kinderarbeid> accessed 14 November 2018. 
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The French loi relative au devoir de vigilance also establishes a link between due diligence and 
civil corporate liability96 – at least, both elements of due diligence and liability are mentioned in 
one single document. It requires that large companies based in France establish and implement a 
vigilance plan. In addition, it states that companies are liable and obliged to compensate for harm 
that due diligence would have permitted to avoid. After several back-and-forth exchanges between 
the two parliamentary chambers,97 it reads as follows: 
 
Art. L. 225-102-4. Any company that at the end of two consecutive financial years, 
employs at least five thousand employees within the company and its direct and indirect 
subsidiaries, whose head office is located on French territory, or that has at least ten 
thousand employees in its service and in its direct or indirect subsidiaries, whose head 
office is located on French territory or abroad, must establish and implement an 
effective vigilance plan. […] 
 
The plan shall include the reasonable vigilance measures to allow for risk identification 
and for the prevention of severe violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
serious bodily injury or environmental damage or health risks resulting directly or 
indirectly from the operations of the company and of the companies it controls […] as 
well as from the operations of the subcontractors or suppliers with whom it maintains 
an established commercial relationship, when such operations derive from this 
relationship. 
 
The plan shall be drafted in association with the company stakeholders involved, and 
where appropriate, within multiparty initiatives that exist in the subsidiaries or at 
territorial level. It shall include the following measures: 1. A mapping that identifies, 
analyses and ranks risks; 2. Procedures to regularly assess, in accordance with the risk 
mapping, the situation of subsidiaries, subcontractors or suppliers with whom the 
 
96 Loi no 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre (FR). 
97 See Sénat, ‘Loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d'ordre’, 
<www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl14–376.html> accessed 14 November 2018, for the travaux préparatoires. 
 20 
 
company maintains an established commercial relationship; 3. Appropriate action to 
mitigate risks or prevent serious violations; 4. An alert mechanism that collects 
reporting of existing or actual risks, developed in working partnership with the trade 
union organizations representatives of the company concerned; 5. A monitoring 
scheme to follow up on the measures implemented and assess their efficiency. 
 
The vigilance plan and its effective implementation report shall be publicly disclosed 
[…] 
Art. 225-102-5. – According to the conditions laid down in Articles 1240 and 1241 of 
the Civil Code, the author of any failure to comply with the duties specified in Article 
L. 225-102-4 of this code shall be liable and obliged to compensate for the harm that 
due diligence would have permitted to avoid […]98 
 
The French Law presents many similarities with the Swiss popular initiative. First, article L.225-
102-4 introduces a mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence obligation. The law 
covers, more precisely than the Swiss initiative, severe violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, serious bodily injury or environmental damage, and health risks. It lists five reasonable 
vigilance measures to adequately identify and prevent risks related to those matters.99 As for the 
Swiss popular initiative, this due diligence process is based on the international human rights due 
diligence framework. Companies must identify risks, take appropriate actions to mitigate them, 
and account for the measures taken.  
 
The French law also makes clear that these due diligence duties extend beyond the company’s own 
operations. They additionally apply to operations of the companies it controls, and those of the 
subcontractors or suppliers with whom the company maintains an established commercial 
relationship. In comparison, due diligence duties in the Swiss initiative apply to ‘controlled 
 
98 Non-official translation provided by the European Coalition for Corporate Justice and published on 
14 December 2016 available at <https://business-humanrights.org/en/french-duty-of-vigilance-bill-english-
translation> accessed 14 November 2018. 
99 Sandra Cossart, Jérôme Chaplier, and Tiphaine Beau de Lomenie, ‘The French Law on Duty of Care: A Historic 
Step Towards Making Globalization Work for All’ (2017) 2 Business and Human Rights Journal 317, 320. 
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companies and all business relationships’.100 It must be noted that the French law limits the scope 
of due diligence to the operations of subcontractors and suppliers ‘with whom the company 
maintains an established commercial relationship’. In French law, an established commercial 
relationship is defined as a stable, regular commercial relationship, taking place with or without a 
contract, with a certain volume of business, and under a reasonable expectation that the relationship 
will last.101 Whether this precision makes the scope of the due diligence narrower than the one in 
the Swiss initiative depends greatly on how ‘business relationships’ will be translated and 
interpreted in the law implementing the Swiss initiative, if it is accepted. 
 
However, there are at least four differences with the Swiss popular initiative. First, the French Law 
applies only to very large companies,102 while the Swiss initiative only requires taking into account 
the needs of small and medium-sized companies. The second and third difference pertain to 
liability. Article L.225-102-5 expressly establishes a fault liability for the company’s own actions 
and omissions on the basis of the general tort of negligence. It states that the author of any failure 
to comply with its due diligence duties shall be liable and obliged to compensate for the harm that 
due diligence would have permitted to avoid. This fault liability for the company’s own conduct is 
only intended in the Swiss initiative.103 In practice, however, fault liability should apply in a similar 
manner. 
 
The third difference is that the French Law does not introduce specific liability for others, whilst 
the Swiss initiative introduces liability for the harm caused by controlled companies. This does not 
mean that French parent or contracting companies cannot be liable for harm resulting from the 
operations of subsidiaries or suppliers at all, as presented in the previous paragraph. However, 
without specific liability for others, it remains for the plaintiff to prove that a French company 
failed to comply with its due diligence duties regarding the operations of these (foreign) 
companies,104 which has implications for the plaintiffs. According to the Swiss initiative, it is 
 
100 See Swiss Initiative on Responsible Business and section 12.3.2.  
101 Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau de Lomenie (n 999) 320. 
102 Code of Commerce (FR), art L. 225-102-4, I, para 1. 
103 See Swiss Initiative on Responsible Business and section 12.3.2, in particular n 70. 
104 Cossart, Chaplier, and Beau de Lomenie (n 99) 321. 
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instead up to the controlling company to prove that it conducted due diligence regarding its 
controlled companies.  
 
Finally, the French law does not expressly make article L.225-102-4 and 5 mandatory overriding 
provisions of French law. Under EU Regulation 864/2007, the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligation arising out of a tort will generally be the law of the country in which the damage 
occurred.105 Thus, it is questionable whether they will apply in practice in international matters 
concerning torts at all. A judge would first need to establish their mandatory character – however, 
regarding the travaux préparatoires and the purpose of article 225-102-4 and 5, this should be the 
case. It seems indeed unthinkable to adopt provisions aimed explicitly at ensuring that French 
companies respect human rights and the environment in France and abroad and not apply them 
when the situation requires it. Table 12.1 summarizes the findings of section 12.4. It compares 
domestic legal instruments on business and human rights adopted and currently in discussion. 
 
Table 12.1: Comparative overview legislative initiatives 
 
<INSERT TABLE 12.1 HERE>   
 
12.5 Conclusion 
  
The Swiss Popular Initiative on Responsible Business aims to ensure that companies based in 
Switzerland respect human rights and the environment in Switzerland and abroad. It introduces 
mandatory due diligence and clarifies the legal consequence of a failure to conduct it. In particular, 
it introduces a specific liability provision for controlling companies. By clarifying the conditions 
under which companies may be held liable, the Swiss initiative goes beyond mandatory disclosure 
and due diligence laws.  
 
Clarifying the conditions of liability for multinational enterprises could reduce the uncertainty 
related to outcomes of transnational civil litigation for corporate human rights and environmental 
 
105 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) [2007] OJ L 199/40, art 4. 
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abuses.106 This is a smart move. What happens in jurisdictions hosting transnational corporations 
but having no such laws? The judiciary must rule on parent or contracting company liability based 
on unclear conditions of liability. This volume exemplifies this in the English cases of Chandler v 
Cape and Thompson v The Renwick, and the French ones Areva and Comilog. This will happen 
again in the German case of Jabir et al. v KiK and the cases against Shell in the Netherlands. Why 
not simply clarify the conditions of liability? 
  
 
106 Bueno (n 8) 580. 
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